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Abstract 
The objective of the research was to analyse the influence of Good Corporate 
Governance, Leverage, and Profitability on Earning Management in the Manufacture 
Companies listed in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. The research used explanatory 
research method. The population was 144 manufacture companies with total 
observation of 318, and 106 of them were used as the samples, taken by using 
proportional random sampling technique. The data were gathered by conducting 
documentary study and analysed by using panel data regression analysis. The result of 
the research showed that, simultaneously, Good Corporate Governance, Leverage, and 
Profitability had the influence on Earning Management. Partially, Good Corporate 
Governance and Leverage did not have any influence on Earning Management, while 
Profitability had the influence on Earning Management. 
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1. Introduction 
According to Ang (1997) the capital market is a situation where sellers and buyers can 
negotiate the exchange of a commodity or group of commodities, and the commodity 
exchanged here is capital, where capital is something that is used by companies as a 
source of funds to carry out company activities . To enter and invest in the capital 
market, investors need information that explains the company's current and past 
performance. This information is disclosed by the company in the form of financial 
statements. Financial statements are the final result of the accounting process and are a 
reflection of the financial condition of a company. The financial statements are expected 
to provide information to investors and creditors in making decisions relating to their 
investment funds. The parameter used to measure management performance in financial 
statements is the profit information contained in the Profit / Loss report (Boediono, 
2005). But this information is not always accurate. 
Profit / Loss Report is one component of financial statements that is very 
important because it contains profit information that is useful for users of information to 
determine the ability and financial performance of the company. According to the 
Statement of Financial Accounting Concept (SFAC) No.1, earnings information is an 
indicator to measure performance at management's responsibility in achieving 
predetermined operating goals and helps the owner to estimate the company's earnings 
power in the future. In preparing financial statements, the use of accrual basis can 
provide flexibility to the management in choosing accounting methods as long as they 
do not deviate from the rules of the applicable Financial Accounting Standards. 
Earnings management can be defined as "deliberate management intervention in 
the process of determining profits, usually to fulfill personal goals" (Wild, Jhon. J, 
2008). Scott (2008) divides ways of understanding earnings management into two. First, 
seeing it as manager's opportunistic behaviour to maximize its utility in the face of 
compensation contracts, debt contracts and political costs (opportunistic earnings 
management). Second, by looking at earnings management from the perspective of 
efficient contracting (Efficient Earning Management), where earnings management 
gives managers a flexibility to protect themselves and the company in anticipating 
unexpected events for the benefit of the parties involved in the contract. 
This earnings management action has raised several cases, one of which is the 
Case of PT Indofarma Tbk, which occurred when BAPEPAM found indications of 
hiding important information concerning losses for two consecutive years suffered by 
PT Indofarma Tbk. The results of the study also found evidence of the value of 
overstated goods in the presentation of the value of the inventory in the process for the 
financial year of 2001 of Rp. 28.87 billion. As a result, the cost of goods sold is 
understated and net income is overstated with the same value. This case is almost the 
same as the case experienced by PT KAI, except that the status of PT Indofarma Tbk is 
an issuer or public company where the shares are listed in the stock market. In addition 
to these cases there are several other earnings management cases revealed in Indonesia 
such as the case that occurred at PT. Ades Alfindo, PT. Bank Lippo Tbk, PT. National 
Gas Companies, and others (Sulistiawan, Januarsi and Alvia, 2011). Financial scandals 
also occur in developed countries, such as in the United States (US), including Enron, 
Merck, World Com and the majority of other companies in the United States (Cornett, 
Saunders and Tehranian, 2006). 
One example of a newly sanctioned company from the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(IDX) is PT Inovisi Infracom Tbk (INVS), a company engaged in the provision of 
mobile telecommunication infrastructure services. PT Inovisi Infracom Tbk (INVS) 
received sanctions for suspension of shares trading by the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(BEI) on February 13, 2015 and later could lead to the delisting of shares of PT Inovisi 
Infracom Tbk (INVS) by IDX . This sanction was given because there were many errors 
in the company's financial statements for the third quarter of 2014. Ujiyantho (2009) 
states that one method used to monitor contract problems and limit opportunist ic 
behavior of management is corporate governance. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis 
2.1. Agency Theory 
The existence of a transition in the business environment resulted in the company that 
was once only owned by one person, the owner-manager is now a company whose 
ownership is spread with shareholders owned by various groups. This transition resulted 
in a separation between ownership and management, where ownership was in the hands 
of the shareholders while management was in the hands of the management team. This 
agency relationship is a contract in which one or more parties (principals) assign tasks 
to other parties (agents) to carry out services and delegate authority in decision making 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This relationship is called agency theory. 
Agency theory developed by Michael Johnson (1976), a professor from Harvard 
views that company management as an agent for shareholders will act with full 
awareness for their own interests, not as a wise and wise and fair party to shareholders. 
This is what will lead to agency problems (Emirzon, 2007).The existence of different 
and contradictory positions, functions, interests, and background of the principal and 
agent, but need each other, inevitably in practice will lead to conflict, mutual interest 
and influence from each other (Emirzon, 2007). This results in a deviation in reporting 
to the principal due to the desire to fulfill personal goals such as wanting to maximize 
its utility, which allows the agent not to always do the best for the principal, so that 
agency problems arise. 
 
2.2.Earnings Management 
According to Healy and Wahlen (1999), the definition of earnings management contains 
several aspects. The first earnings management intervention on financial reporting can 
be done using judgment, for example judgment is needed in estimating a number of 
future economic events to be shown in financial statements, such as estimated economic 
life and residual value of fixed assets, liabilities for pensions, deferred taxes, losses 
accounts receivable and decrease in asset value. Besides that managers have choices for 
accounting methods, such as depreciation methods and cost methods. Second, the 
purpose of earnings management is to mislead stakeholders regarding the economic 
performance of the company. 
 
2.3. Good Corporate Governance (GCG) 
GCG is a system that regulates and controls companies to create added value for their 
shareholders. The external and internal situations of manufacturing companies are 
increasingly complex so that the risks of manufacturing business activities are 
increasingly diverse and indirectly demand the practice of sound corporate governance. 
The application of GCG principles in addition to increasing competitiveness also 
provides protection to the public. The GCG system provides effective protection for 
shareholders and creditors so that they are sure to get a return on their investment 
correctly. 
 
2.4. Leverage 
Leverage is the ability of a company to use assets or funds that have a fixed burden 
(debt) effectively so they can obtain the optimal level of business income (Arrita, 2004). 
Leverage describes the source of operating funds used by the company and shows the 
risks faced by the company. The greater the risk faced by the company, the uncertainty 
to generate future profits will also increase, there is a relationship between leverage 
ratios and company returns where leverage will affect the level and variability of after-
tax income which further affects the overall level of risk and return of the company. The 
greater the level of leverage means the level of high return uncertainty, but on the other 
hand the amount of return given will be even greater (Van Horne, James and 
Wachhowicz, 2007). 
 
2.5.Profitability 
Profit is an indicator of performance carried out by management in managing the 
company's wealth. Profit functions to measure the net effectiveness of a business 
venture. Profit will also guarantee future capital supply for innovation and business 
expansion (Pearce, et.al., 2010). The performance of a company can be seen from the 
level of profit. Profitability is the ability of a company to earn profits in relation to sales, 
total assets and own capital (Sartono in Herni and Yulius Kurnia Susanto, 2008). A high 
level of profitability indicates that the company's performance is good and supervision 
works well, while the low level of profitability indicates that the company's 
performance is not good, and management's performance seems bad in the eyes of the 
principal. 
The form of the conceptual framework to illustrate the concept of the influence of 
GCG that is proxied by the size of commissioners and the audit committee, leverage and 
profitability on earnings management in manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange can be described as follows: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
Hypothesis 
The hypothesis can be interpreted as a temporary answer to the research problem 
formulation (Sugiyono, 2007). The hypothesis in this study is GCG which consists of 
the size of the board of commissioners and the audit committee, leverage, and 
profitability have a simultaneous and partial effect on earnings management. 
 
3. Method 
Basically the general purpose of each research is for theory development and problem 
solving. This research is more specifically intended as a hypothesis testing or 
explanatory research to examine hypotheses that explain phenomena in the form of 
relationships between variables so that they can provide answers to problems 
(Indriantoro and Supomo, 2002). 
 
Location and Research Schedule 
This research was conducted at manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange in 2013-2015 which provided audited financial statement data by accessing 
and downloading the official website of the Indonesia Stock Exchange through the 
website www.idx.co.id. The research schedule is carried out in stages starting from May 
2017 to December 2017. 
 
Research Population 
Population is a generalization area consisting of: objects / subjects that have certain 
qualities and characteristics determined by researchers to be studied and then 
conclusions drawn (Sugiyono, 2011). The population in this study were all 
manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) in 2013 – 2015 
total 144 which were grouped by sub-sector of the company. 
 
 
Good Corporate Governance 
 
 
 
 
Commissioner Size (X1) 
Audit Committee (X2) 
Earnings 
Management (Y) 
Leverage (X3) 
Profitability (X4) 
Research Samples 
The sample is the part or number that has the characteristics of the population 
(Sugiyono, 2011). Sampling in this study was carried out using the Slovin formula, 
namely: 
 
n =  
Information : 
n: Number of sample members 
N: population 
e: error tolerance limit of 5%, then: 
n = = 105,88 or 106 
 
So, the number of samples in this study was rounded up to 106 sectors of the company. 
 
Table 1 Operational Definition of Variables 
Variable 
Operational 
Definition 
Parameter Scale 
Earnings 
Management 
The actions of 
managers to report 
profits that can 
maximize personal or 
corporate interests by 
using accounting 
method policies. 
DACt : (TACt / At-1) – NDAt 
 
Ratio 
Good Corporate 
Governance 
 
A system that 
regulates and 
controls a company 
  
The Size of 
Commissionaire 
 
The total number of 
commissioners from 
internal and external 
companies that 
supervise the 
directors in running 
the company. 
The number of all commissioners who came 
from internal and external companies that 
supervise directors in running the company 
Ratio 
 
Audit 
Committees 
 
 
Additional agencies 
needed in the 
implementation of 
GCG principles that 
carry out the 
functions of 
directors in 
implementing 
company 
management and 
carrying out 
important tasks 
related to the 
financial reporting 
system. 
Number of Audit Committees Ratio 
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N

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Leverage the ability of the 
company to use 
assets or funds that 
have a fixed burden 
(debt) effectively so 
they can obtain an 
optimal level of 
business income. 
 
𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝑡𝑜𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦 =
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐿𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
× 100% 
Ratio 
Profitability Profitability is the 
ability of a company 
to earn profits in 
relation to sales, 
total assets and own 
capital. 
Return on Equity  = x 100 % 
 
Ratio 
 
Data Analysis Method 
Data were analysed using panel data regression method, using the Eviews software tool. 
Panel data means that the statistical method with regression using panel data (pooled 
data) is a combination of time series and cross data. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis testing is done by using a panel data regression analysis model that aims to 
predict how much the influence of the independent variables on the dependent variable 
through the t test and f test with statistical models of the regression model statistical 
equation are: 
 
ML = a + b1UDK + b2KA + b3DER + b4ROE + e 
Information : 
ML = Profit Management 
a = constant 
b1 ........ b4 = Regression coefficient 
UDK = Board of Commissioners Size 
KA = Audit Committee 
DER = Debt to Equity Ratio 
ROE = Return on Equity 
e = error 
 
4.     Result and Discussions 
Descriptive Statistics Analysis 
Descriptive statistics are the process of collecting, presenting, and summarizing which 
serves to provide an overview of data that is adequately studied. The description or 
description of a data can be seen from the mean, minimum, maximum, and standard 
deviation values can be seen in the following table: 
 
 
 
 
 
Equity Total
IncomeNet 
Table 2 Descriptive Statistics 
 ML KA UDK DER ROE 
Mean -0.032301  2.691824  4.389937  56.17128  12.96004 
Median -0.026936  3.000000  3.000000  2.380880  7.439841 
Maximum  0.420504  5.000000  12.00000  1048.006  701.4219 
Minimum -1.476706  0.000000  2.000000 -944.7414 -159.7906 
Std. Dev.  0.158458  1.128633  2.060327  154.5803  54.23725 
Skewness -3.090515 -1.471065  1.309554  2.106040  7.910712 
Kurtosis  28.62099  4.891107  4.680684  23.55183  95.05811 
Jarque-Bera  9203.983  162.0795  128.3186  5831.582  115606.4 
Probability  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000  0.000000 
Sum -10.27158  856.0000  1396.000  17862.47  4121.294 
Sum Sq. Dev.  7.959530  403.7987  1345.648  7574733.  932512.3 
Observations  318  318  318  318  318 
Source: Eviews Result (2017) 
 
Based on descriptive statistics table shows that the amount of research data 
(observations) is 318 observational data shows that earnings management is known that 
the minimum value of -1.476 maximum value of 0.420. This shows that the value of 
earnings management in the sample of this study ranged from -1.476 to 0.420 with an 
average of -0.032 at the standard deviation of 0.158. 
 
Hypothesis Testing 
Testing the hypothesis in this study using the results of the estimation of the fixed 
effects model (FEM) regression model. The estimation results of this model are used to 
see the test coefficient of determination, F test and t test. Estimated results from the 
FEM model are as follows: 
Table 3 Hypothesis Testing 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.185186 1.449600 0.127750 0.8985 
KA -0.053296 0.377735 -0.141095 0.8879 
UDK 0.018809 0.241990 0.077727 0.9381 
DER 1.66E-07 0.000874 0.000190 0.9998 
ROE 0.096300 0.198700 1.978844 0.0283 
     
              Source: Eviews Result (2017) 
 
 
Test F 
The F test is conducted to determine whether the independent variables simultaneously 
have a significant effect or not on the dependent variable. In the fixed effect model can 
be seen in the table as follows: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 Test of F Model Statistics 
     
     Cross-section fixed (dummy variables)  
     
     R-squared 0.762930     Mean dependent var 0.111816 
Adjusted R-squared 0.638697     S.D. dependent var 2.454069 
S.E. of regression 1.475104     Akaike info criterion 3.882645 
Sum squared resid 452.5939     Schwarz criterion 5.183983 
Log likelihood -507.3405     Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.402408 
F-statistic 6.141095     Durbin-Watson stat 2.842595 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000000    
     
     
         Source: Eviews Result (2017) 
 
T test 
The test results of partial influence with t statistical tests basically show how far one 
independent variable individually or partially can explain the variation of the dependent 
variable that is good corporate governance, leverage, and profitability partially have a 
significant influence on earnings management by assuming other independent variables 
are constant. 
Table 5 Test t Model Statistics 
Total pool (balanced) observations: 318  
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.185186 1.449600 0.127750 0.8985 
KA -0.053296 0.377735 -0.141095 0.8879 
UDK 0.018809 0.241990 0.077727 0.9381 
DER 1.66E-07 0.000874 0.000190 0.9998 
ROE 0.096300 0.198700 1.978844 0.0283 
     
              Source: Eviews Result (2017) 
 
Based on the test results in the table above, partially the influence of each 
independent variable on the dependent variable can be described as follows: 
1. The audit committee has a statistical value of -0.141095 <t table of 1.9675 with 
significant prob. = 0.8879 which is greater than α = 0.05 therefore it can be 
concluded that the audit committee variable does not affect earnings 
management in manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX). 
2. The size of the board of commissioners has a statistical value of 0.077727 <t 
table of 1.9675 with significant prob. = 0.9381 which is greater than α = 0.05 
therefore it can be concluded that the variable size of the board of 
commissioners does not affect earnings management in manufacturing 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). 
3. Debt to equity ratio has a statistical value of 0.000190> t table of 1.9675 with 
significant prob. = 0.9998 which is greater than α = 0.05 therefore it can be 
concluded that the variable debt to equity ratio does not significantly influence 
earnings management in manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock 
Exchange (IDX). 
 
 
4. Return on equity has a statistical value of 1.978844> t table of 1.9675 with 
significant prob. = 0.0283 which is smaller than α = 0.05 therefore it can be 
concluded that the return on equity variable affects earnings management in 
manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). 
 
Effect of commissioner size (X1) on earnings management 
The test results partially show that the size of commissioners shows a positive 
regression coefficient of 0.018809 with a statistical value of 0.077727 <t table of 1.9675 
with significant prob. = 0.9381 which is greater than α = 0.05. Positive regression 
coefficients indicate that the size of commissioners is in line with earnings management, 
where the increasing size of commissioners will also increase earnings management. 
Management will be freer in managing earnings because the board of directors has 
become less alert due to the lack of communication and coordination between the 
boards with a large number. In addition to the number of board of commissioners 
above, the effectiveness of board of commissioners' performance can also affect the 
occurrence of earnings management, where supervision by the board of commissioners 
is indicated by the number of intensity frequencies. From the results of the test, 
empirical evidence shows that board size does not affect earnings management. 
 
Effect of audit committee (X2) on earnings management 
The results of the partial testing of the audit committee show a negative regression 
coefficient of -0.053296 with a statistical value of -0.141095 <t table of 1.9675 with 
significant prob. = 0.8879 which is greater than α = 0.05. The negative regression 
coefficient indicates that if the audit committee increases, it will reduce earnings 
management. From the results of these tests, obtained empirical evidence that the audit 
committee does not affect earnings management. The size of the audit committee does 
not affect the practice of earnings management. In accordance with Bapepan No. 
regulation. IX.I.5 explains that the number of audit committees consists of at least 3 
people. So that the existence of an audit committee in sample companies with a 
minimum of 3 people is only a formality to fulfill government regulations but is not 
intended to uphold the mechanism of good corporate governance in the company. 
 
Effect of debt to equity ratio (X3) on earnings management 
The test results partially show that the leverage proxied by the debt to equity ratio 
shows a positive regression coefficient of 1.66E-07 with a statistical value of 0.000190 
<t table of 1.9675 with significant prob. = 0.9998 which is greater than α = 0.05. 
Positive regression coefficient shows that the debt to equity ratio is in line with earnings 
management, where the increasing debt to equity ratio will increase earnings 
management. From the results of these tests, empirical evidence shows that debt to 
equity ratio does not affect earnings management. 
Effect of return on equity (X4) on earnings management 
The test results partially show that profitability proxied by return on equity shows a 
positive regression coefficient of 0.096300 with a statistical value of 1.978844> t table 
of 1.9675 with significant prob. = 0.0283 which is greater than α = 0.05. Positive 
regression coefficient shows that return on equity increases, it will improve earnings 
management. From the results of these tests, empirical evidence is obtained that return 
on equity has an effect on earnings management. It can be explained that profitability is 
a measure of manager's performance, so managers who want to show that their 
performance is good will tend to increase the company's profitability, so to achieve a 
high level of profitability managers need earnings management to control the company's 
profits so that it is not too high or too low. The results of this study are in line with the 
results of the Amperaningrum study (2013) showing that simultaneously there is a 
significant influence between good corporate governance, leverage, and financial 
performance on earnings management. 
 
5.      Conclusion and Recommendations 
Conclusion 
This study aims to see the effect of good corporate governance, leverage, and 
profitability on earnings management. 
The results of this study provide research conclusions, including the following: 
1. Based on the results of simultaneous analysis, the independent variables of good 
corporate governance, leverage, and profitability affect earnings management in 
manufacturing companies in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
2. Based on the results of the partial analysis, good corporate governance 
consisting of the audit committee and board size, and leverage does not affect 
earnings management, while the profitability variable affects earnings 
management. 
 
Research Limitations 
The limitations of this study are: 
1. The test results of the four independent variables on the dependent variable are 
only one variable that affects earnings management in manufacturing companies 
in the Indonesia Stock Exchange. 
2. The period of time of this study is only 3 years and the population of the 
company used as the research sample is only manufacturing. 
 
Recommendations 
In order for the limitations of the study in this study to be refined later by the next 
researcher, the researchers' suggestions include: 
1. For the next researcher in the future to be able to add other independent 
variables or change the audit committee variables and the size of the board of 
commissioners with the Good Corporate Governance variable that is proxied by 
the other which allows the relationship of independent variables to be 
dependent. 
2. For the next researcher in the future, it is better to add a period of time greater 
than 3 years in order to see more accurate research results and add to the 
population of the company that is used as research samples, not only in 
manufacturing companies but in other types of industries. 
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